Here is part two of two as far as translations from FdeSouche are concerned - next up will be some of my own work concerning the life, and especially the tempestuous youth, of Napoleon III.
“Embrace Louis, he is perhaps the future of my race.”
- Napoleon I
Part 2: Napoleon III, the Diplomat
The foreign policy
of Napoleon III always followed three main goals: the first, to bring
France back to the rank of a great power by the abolition of the
treaties of 1815 ; the second, to have coincide as well as possible
territories with nationalities (unification of Italy) ; the third, to
put an end to great wars by favoring conflict resolution through
negotiation in a congress system which would regularly meet. Napoleon
III succeeded in the first of these, the second turned itself against
him (unification of Germany), and he was shown to be a visionary
concerning the third objective, considering the later installation of
the League of Nations.
I - The Europe of
Napoleon III
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| The Congress of Vienna |
After the fall of
the First Empire, the Allies erected at the Congress of Vienna a new
European balance of power dressed against France, and maintained by
the Holy Alliance (Russian Empire, Austrian Empire, Kingdom of
Prussia). This new European order was intolerable to the French and
Napoleon III owed a good portion of his popularity to his will to
call it in question. The treaties of 1815 were effectively abolished
by the emperor's intervention in Italy to chase away Austria, and by
the attachment of Nice and Savoie.
Napoleon III wanted
to therefore ensure a role for France in Europe by taking the head of
a movement to revise the borders of 1815. The emperor doesn't forget
France: the whole process is a manner to remodel Europe in order to
spread French influence. In essence, France would obtain
compensations justified by the principle of nationalities: Nice,
Savoie, Belgium, Luxembourg, and eventually the left bank of the
Rhine. In Italy, Louis-Napoleon supported Piedmont-Sardinia but
preferred a confederation consisting of Piedmont in the North, Naples
in the South, and the Pope (as president of the confederation) in the
center, to outright unification. For Germany, the emperor's ideal was
a three-headed confederation, with Austria, the Southern German
states headed by Bavaria, and Prussia to the North. France could then
control the German confederation as a result of the francophilic
Southern states, and penetrate Italy through Piedmont-Sardinia.
Cavour and Bismarck would evidently not accept any solution other
than unification pure and simple.
However, Napoleon
III did not commit to revoking the “European Concert” instituted
in 1815. An “entente cordiale” was to form between
European nations by the mechanism of regular congresses. The Congress
of Paris in 1856 marked the triumph of France: the question of
nationalism was clearly asked, Russia was pushed to the margins, the
Balkans were discussed (Serbia, Moldovia, and Wallachia received the
protection of Europe). In 1862, Romania was formed and would owe a
large part of its existence to Napoleon III.
The end of European
fragmentation and the application of the principles of nationality
were also seen as a manner to pacify Europe, to counter the rising
force of the United States (of America) and Russia. “A more
strongly constituted Europe, rendered more homogenous by precise
territorial divisions, is a guarantee for peace on the continent and
is neither a peril nor a pain for our nation... While the ancient
populations of the continent, in their restrained territories, grow
only with a certain slowness, Russia and the United States of America
could, in under a century, each hold 100 million men... It is in the
interest of the European center to not remain fragmented as states
without force and without public spirit.” (La Vallette circulation,
September 1856).
II - Napoleon III
and Great Britain
The emperor knew England well since he had spent a part of his exile there: five stays between 1831 and 1848 that represented a total stay of four years and eleven months. He was impressed by the industrial development and its political system (which he nevertheless did not think could be imported to France). While in power, he understood he could not abolish the clauses of the 1815 treaties relating to France without British support. The alliance with Great Britain would remain throughout his reign as a pillar of his foreign policy.
Russia gave
Napoleon III the opportunity to get closer to London. The Tsar's
great ambition was to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, “sick man of
Europe”, with an expansionary push to Constantinople. Neither Paris
nor London could accept the Tsar taking control of the Balkans. The
two countries allied themselves to each other in the Crimean War
(1854-1856), and won, though at the cost of many lives.
Napoleon III and
Eugenie visited Great Britian in April of 1855, and Victoria and
Prince Albert came to France in August. The two voyages were great
popular successes. During the second one, Victoria went to Les
Invalides and bowed before the tomb of Napoleon I. Napoleon III
and Victoria would remain good friends until the death of the former.
Relations with
Great Britain did degrade after the Italian Wars (Victoria and Albert
were relatively favorable towards Austria) and especially after the
annexation of Nice and Savoie. The English, remembering the wars of
the Revolution and Empire (Savoie had been a French departement
in 1792 and Nice in 1793, until the end of the Empire), were wary of
any future annexations. Napoleon III was becoming imperialist like
his uncle. A good relationship was nevertheless reignited in the
following years, especially from 1866 onwards, as Queen Victoria was
becoming a ferocious opponent of Bismarck. But Great Britain, with
its small army mainly stationed in India (revolt of the Cipayes in
1857) and in Canada (with the threat of the U.S. Civil War), and it's
outdated fleet could not intervene to help the emperor in the
Franco-Prussian War, and the Prime Minister Gladstone was since 1868
resolutely isolationist.
During his exile,
the English showed sympathy towards the fallen emperor. On the night
of Napoleon III's death (1873), Victoria wrote in her journal: “[he
was] the most faithful ally of England...”
III – Napoleon
III and Italy
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| The Battle of Solferino |
In his youth,
Louis-Napoleon, unable too fight for his country (affected by exile),
fought in Italy with his brother Napoleon-Louis and the Carbonari in
favor of Italian unity. In 1848, the peninsula was the theater for a
revolutionary outburst and a revolt against Austria, which at the
time occupied the North-East. Cavour, one of the ministers of
Victor-Emmanuel II, king of Piedmont-Sardinia, began a policy of
getting closer to France. Napoleon III remained sensitive to his
youthful adventures and the French were profoundly Austrophobic.
Napoleon III saw in
intervention the opportunity to restore dynastic prestige, and to
make himself the champion of nationalist causes, getting closer to
Italy. In his entourage, few opposed the notion, except the Empress
and especially Charles de Morny, his half-brother, the “number two”
of the Empire, who feared the movement to unite Italy would bleed
over into Germany. The future would give him reason.
Napoleon III
remained hesitant, and it was the Orsini incident (1858) that placed
him in the Piedmontese camp. The Imperial couple were victim of an
assassination attempt in front of the Opera, and survived
miraculously intact. Orsini, an Italian patriot, wanted to overthrow
the Empire, thinking a republic would be more favorable to the
Italian cause. Before moving in, he shouted “Long live Italy!”.
Cavour and the emperor had a secret interview at Plombieres (Vosges),
on the 21st and 22nd of July 1858. They came to
an agreement on the creation of a kingdom of Upper-Italy uniting,
outside of Piedmont and Sardinia, Lombardy and Venice (taken from
Austria), and the Duchies of Parma and Modena.
Before entering the
war, France ensured the neutrality of Prussia and Russia.
Franz-Joseph, pressured by his ministers, declared war first on the
27th of April of 1859. Austria aligned 150,000 men,
Piedmont 60,000, and France 100,000. The beginning of the campaign
began with total improvisation by the Allies (lack of ammunition,
tents, and supplies). The first victory was won with difficulty at
Palestro on the 30th of May. It is at Magenta, the 4th
of June, that the first large battle was fought, though it was for a
while quite confused, ending in the victory of the Franco-Piedmont
forces. Victor-Emmanuel and Napoleon III entered in triumph at Milan
on the 8th of June.
Franz-Joseph then
decided to take direct command of the army, and increased the number
of troops at his disposal to 250,000. On the 24th of June,
a second great battle took place at Solferino. The Franco-Piedmont
forces took the day with heavy losses: 40,000 dead, including 17,500
Frenchmen. The emperor was shocked by the battlefield, according to
general Bourbaki. Prussia began to threaten by mobilizing its troops
on the Rhine. Not willing to weaken Austria excessively, Napoleon III
signed an armistice with Franz-Joseph on the 8th of July
1859.
But the Italian
campaign was not satisfactory for many. Numerous patriotic
insurrections exploded in central Italy, which menaced the temporal
power of the Papacy. Italians would have preferred continuing the war
(as Venice still remained Austrian). For French republicans and
Italian patriots, Napoleon III did not go far enough. For Catholics
who blamed the emperor for the agitations in the pontifical
territories (which resulted in massacre), he went too far. The
Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia returned to France the provinces of Nice
and Savoie, ratified by two plebiscite (1860).
IV – Responsible
for the War of 1870?
| Otto von Bismarck |
Since 1866 and the
defeat of Austria by Prussia, Bismarck sees the Second Empire as the
main obstacle to German unity. The chancellor nevertheless needed a
valid reason to declare war, and to take the mantle of a victim, if
possible: the Bavarians and Rhinelanders were francophilic and
genuinely liked the Emperor of the French. The defensive pact between
the North German Confederation and the Southern states only applied
in cases of foreign aggression.
Spain allowed
Bismarck to reach his goals. In 1868, Spain chased Queen Isabella II
and her son Alphonse from the throne, and the new junta in Madrid
began searching for a new sovereign. Bismarck put forward the
candidature of Leopold von Hohenzollern, a colonel in the Prussian
army. Napoleon III could not accept this candidate, which if
successful would surround France, an unpopular concept. The king of
Prussia, William I, was reticent to Bismarck's wishes and Leopold
refused to be a part of the affair.
Bismarck however
could not end it there. He reiterate Leopold's candidature without
informing the king of Prussia. This news was delivered on the 2nd
of July 1870 by a communique of France-Presse. In the days
that followed, the press – opposition or bonapartist – was
envenomed, demanding war to save France's honor. However, the 12th
of July, Leopold's candidature was withdrawn. “I am happy this will
end like this. A war is always a big adventure,” said the emperor.
In Berlin, that very day, Roon and Interior Minister Eulenbourg
convinced Bismarck to declare a war of aggression. Moltke and Roon
wanted war to be declared immediately, but the chancellor judged it
prudent to wait a little before doing so, to be on the safe side.
It is therefore
important to know that the war was decided in Berlin, before even
being decided in Paris. The emperor was weakened physically and
mentally ; he suffered from kidney stones, fainted on occasion,
contracted fevers, and had blood in his urine. Treatment against the
pain had him sleeping almost all day.
In Paris, the
emperor was moved by the manifestations in the street, more or less
spontaneous and hostile to Prussia, and by the fervent patriotism
evident in the Parisians. Paris is not the rest of the country, which
ardently desired peace, but prefects only expedited their reports
every fifteen days. 36 years later, Eugenie affirmed: “to back
down, to give way, we could not, we would had the whole country
against us! … Already we were accused of weakness ; a terrible
phrase arrived to our ears: “the Hohenzollern candidature, it will
be a second Sadowa!”.” Then, pushed to war by the bellicose
members of the court (Foreign Affairs minister Gramont, Marechal
Leboeuf, General Boubakir, and Eugenie), the emperor accepted it. The
empress in particular, through her influence, had a large role in the
initiation of the conflict: “this victory which cost neither tears
nor blood would be for us the worst humiliation! If Prussia refuses
to fight us, we will force it, by beating its back with the butt of
rifles, to pass back over the Rhine, and clear out the left bank!
This peace we have been discussing for twenty-four hours is very
sinister.”
General Boubakir,
known as an expert on Prussia, affirmed that “out of ten chances,
we have eight!”. Leboeuf said as well: “war with Prussia is
inevitable, sooner or later. We are ready, are enemy is not. We have
a superb army, admirably disciplined ; we will never again have such
an opportunity. From Paris to Berlin, it will be a promenade, cane in
hand.” Napoleon III and Gramont drafted a statement to be
dispatched by telegraph to Ems. Bismarck then had what he wanted: if
the king of Prussia confirmed at the reception of the news that
Leopold renounced the Spanish throne, Bismarck could write his famous
dispatch, a work of disinformation diffused throughout Europe, which
rang as an insult to France.
The false dispatch
arrived the 15th of July 1870 in Paris, and the
Legislative Corps voted for war at near-unanimity (245 votes –
including republican ones – against 10 ; amongst the ten, that of
Adolphe Thiers), a decision which Napoleon III had to go along with.
Republicans had however rejected an 1867 military reform to prolong
the length of military service, allowing for more troops. Even
Gambetta, who in his “profession of faith” to voters stated that
he desired to eliminate the professional army, voted for war... On
the 19th of July, war was officially declared. Napoleon
III said on the 22nd: “There are in the life of peoples,
solemn moments where national honor, violently excited, imposes
itself as an irresistible force […] It is the entirety of the
nation that, in its irresistible elan, dictated our
resolutions.”
---
Translation of an article on FdeSouche Histoire.“Napoleon III and Europe (part 2)”
Published on the 2nd of December 2012 at
http://histoire.fdesouche.com/100-100
as
"Napoléon III et l'Europe (partie 2)"




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